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Unemployment, Inflation, 
and "Guest Workers" 
Comparative Study of Three European Countries 
Adolf Sturmthal 
An attempt is made hère to show the conditions under which 
Austria, West Germany and Sweden hâve corne doser than other 
countries in attaining the double objective offull employment and 
price stability. Answers appear to lie in the direction of Gross 
Dômes tic Product and the idea of a "Social Contract". 
In the area of industrial relations in the Western market économies, the 
problem of combining low unemployment with a maximum of price stabili-
ty ranks high on the research agenda. Indeed, judging by the events of the 
last few years, it may be the most urgent of the political problems confron-
ting both démocratie governments and their opponents. Three of the mem-
ber countries of OECD seem to hâve performed conspicuously better than 
the average, either in combining low unemployment and at most average 
(i.e., OECD-average) rates of inflation. They are Austria, West Germany, 
and Sweden. 
"Incomes policy can be described as fixing the price of labor instead of 
fixing the price of gold."1 The purpose is, of course, to fix also priées of 
commodities and services; sometimes directly, sometimes by way of wage-
fixing. The main task of the policy-makers is to devise ways by which insti-
tutional difficultés, also labelled rigidities, can be overcome. In what fol-
lows we do not seek to answer the question of how désirable incomes policy 
is nor whether it is sufficient to achieve the desired results without inter-
fering with the optimum allocation of resources, except in so far as the poli-
cy or the means by which it is pursued may detract from the objective of 
maintaining or achieving what is somewhat erroneously called full employ-
• STURMTHAL, Adolf, Professor Emeritus, Institute of Labor and Industrial Rela-
tions, University of Illinois, Urbana-Campaign, Illinois, U.S.A. 
** The author acknowledges the financial support of the German Marshall Fund in the 
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ment. We shall attempt to show the conditions under which the three coun-
tries mentioned above, hâve corne doser than others in attaining the double 
objective of full employment and price stability or at least one of the two 
without getting too far in violating the other objective. Moreover the "suc-
cess" appears to be limited to a period — years or at the most two décades. 
For obvious reasons, the conclusions which we obtain are merely sugges-
tive, but even this modest resuit seems worthwhile to establish. 
We shall set out the data which permit us to speak of relative successes, 
and then state the hypothèses intuitively obtained, partly by interviews with 
policy-makers, partly by our previous expérience in the opération of the in-
dustrial relation Systems. Finally, we examine one alternative suggestion 
which uses the flexibility in the employment of "guest-workers" as the main 
explanatory variable. 
1. To begin with we quote rates of inflation as measured by the respec-
tive cost of living indices of the three countries as well as the OECD 
average, U.S. and Canada2. For the period since 1968 we obtain the follow-
ing rates of increase3. 
TABLE 1 
Cost of Living Indices 
West Germany Sweden Austria OECD U.S. Can. 
1968 2.9 1.9 2.8 4.0 4.2 4.0 
1969 1.9 2.9 3.1 4.8 5.4 4.6 
1970 3.4 7.0 4.4 5.6 5.9 3.3 
1971 5.3 7.4 4.7 5.3 4.3 2.9 
1972 5.5 6.0 6.4 4.7 3.3 4.8 
1973 7.0 6.7 7.5 7.8 6.2 7.5 
1974 7.0 9.9 9.5 13.5 11.0 10.9 
1975 5.9 9.8 8.4 11.3 9.1 10.8 
1976 4.5 10.3 7.3 8.6 5.8 7.5 
1977 3.7 11.4 5.5 8.9 6.5 8.0 
1978 2.7 10.0 3.6 7.9 7.7 9.0 
1979 4.1 7.2 3.7 9.8 11.3 9.1 
1980 5.5 13.8 6.3 12.4 10.1 
2 There are, of course, not inconsiderable différences in the methods of measuring 
changes of the cost of living. For our purposes, I believe them to be of little significance. 
3 Source: I.L.O., Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 1980 and OECD, Main Economie In-
dicators, 1980, Vol. 3; Economie Outlook 28, table p. 135. For U.S. 1980 — Economie Indi-
cators, August 1981, p. 24 — Changes in Consumer Priées. Statistics-Canada, The Consumer 
Price Index, Catalogue No. 62-001. 
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Apart from Switzerland, Austria and West Germany hâve the best 
record among the Western market économies in controlling inflation while 
Sweden follows roughly the average OECD pattern. Only Switzerland had 
lower inflation rates than Austria and Germany, but in view of its relatively 
weak and divided unions this is a less significant fact. 
Thèse figures take on their full significance in the light of the corre-
sponding unemployment data. Once again we must warn against a strict at-
tempt at international comparisons; the définitions of who is unemployed 
vary from country to country. Yet some meaning may be attached to the 
différent rates if their variation is considérable. Accordingly, for the period 
from 1968 to 1980, we obtain the following unemployment rates (seasonally 
adjusted monthly averages for the years indicated): 
TABLE 2 
Unemployment Rates 
7 Major countries 
Year BRD Austria Sweden (a, b) (averages) U.S. 
1968 1.5 2.1 2.9 2.9 3.4 
1969 0.8 1.8 2.8 2.7 3.4 
1970 0.7 1.5 2.4 3.2 4.8 
1971 0.9 2.5 2.1 3.7 5.7 
1972 1.1 2.7 1.9 3.8 5.4 
1973 1.3 2.5 1.6 3.4 4.7 
1974 2.6 2.0 1.5 3.7 5.4 
1975 4.7 1.6 2.0 5.4 8.3 
1976 4.6 1.6 2.0 5.4 7.5 
1977 4.5 1.8 1.8 5.4 6.9 
1978 4.3 2.2 2.1 5.1 6.9 
1979 3.8 2.1 2.0 5.0 5.7 
1980 3.9 1.9 1.9 7.2 
a. Preliminary figures. See OECD: Economie Outlook, December 1980. 
b. U.S., Japan, Germanu, France, U.K., Italy, Canada. 
EEC as a whole 8.4 percent in 1981. U.K. 11,5 percent (the NY Times, Oct. 26, 1981). 
c. Statistics-Canada, Historical-Labour Force Statistics. Catalogue No. 71-201. 
While the Fédéral Republic shows at times relatively high unemploy-
ment rates — though high only compared to the two other countries — both 
Austria and Sweden maintain consistently an exceedingly low rate of unem-
ployment. It is true that, in the case of Sweden, employment is maintained 
by way of public works and other labor market measures, but this is precise-
ly the policy adopted by the government with the support of public opinion. 
Moreover, there is no obvious reason why such employment should not be 
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considered équivalent to any other employment, private or public. Indeed, 
in any Western country a good deal of employment is the resuit of public 
works and only the most orthodox laissez-faire economist would claim that 
schools, highways, hospitals, police, fire brigades, training, and other simi-
lar institutions do not contribute to gênerai welfare, simply because they are 
not financed directly by private means4. 
The facts are thus as follows: Austria and the BRD show both low un-
employment and low inflation rates, low relative to the OECD average and 
in particular to the U.S. and the U.K., Sweden has maintained similarly low 
unemployment rates, when compared with the U.S. or U.K., but its rate of 
inflation is close to the OECD average both for OECD-Europe and OECD 
world-wide, and — at least for the second half of the 70's — higher than the 
U.S. rate. Its achievement is mainly in the area of reducing unemployment. 
In the light of international data and the Phillips curves based on them, 
such low unemployment would commonly be expected to go hand in hand 
with far higher rates of increase of consumers' priées, or vice versa: thèse in-
flation rates would correspond to far higher unemployment5. 
In other words, ail three countries hâve succeeded in avoiding to a con-
sidérable extent the Phillips curve dilemma or, put again differently, hâve 
moved their respective curves to the Left. 
2. Data concerning the rate of growth of the gross domestic product in 
the three countries as compared to more gênerai data are presented in ta-
ble 3. 
TABLE 3 
Growth Rates of the Gross Domestic Product6 
OECD- United 
Year Austria BRD Sweden Europe Kingdom 
1973 + 5.3 + 5.1 + 3.5 + 5.6 + 5.5 
1974 + 4.3 + 0.7 + 4.0 + 2.2 + 0.3 
1975 — 1.5 — 1.8 + 0.9 + 1.2 —1.6 
1976 + 6.2 + 5.3 + 1.5 + 4.3 + 3.0 
1977 + 3.7 + 2.8 —2.1 + 2.3 + 1.9 
1978 + 1.0 + 3.6 + 2.4 + 3.0 + 3.5 
1979 + 5.1 + 4.5 + 3.8 + 3.3 + 1.5 
4 Obviously, the reverse is also true. Not every public or private activity can be justified 
merely because it was undertaken. Facile generalizations are not necessarily true on either side 
of the debate. 
5 In the case of the U.S., for instance, an inflation rate similar to that of Sweden would 
correspond to an unemployment rate almost four times as high as the Swedish. 
6 Source: OECD. Data for 1980 are estimâtes and hâve not been included in this table. 
The estimâtes indicate a slow-down of économie growth in most OECD countries. 
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Briefly summarized, thèse data indicate that the rate of économie expan-
sion in the three countries was in gênerai superior or equal, or only slightly 
inferior to that of the European OECD countries. But the 1975-76 crisis — 
slightly delayed in Sweden — hit them more severely than OECD-Europe, 
or for that matter OECD world-wide. While it would seem reasonable to 
assume that a social consensus can be most readily obtained and maintained 
when économie growth provides benefits to distribute, it would seem that 
temporary set-backs are tolerable and that insofar as growth is conducive to 
consensus, this factor operated in most of the OECD countries in the 70's 
— without being accompanied everywhere by successful attempts at for-
ming social contracts. At the same time, économie growth in the U.K., 
roughly equal to that of Sweden, did not prevent sharp social conflicts. It is 
conceivable also that the chain of causation runs the opposite direction, i.e., 
that a successful price stabilization policy made full employment possible. 
However, the Swedish data would not fit this reasoning. 
Still, the rate of économie growth following the postwar reconstruction 
period was high, at least until the middle 70's, and in West Germany and 
Austria even beyond that date. Undoubtedly, the rate was high compared to 
the period between the two wars, and for most of the contemporary citizens 
it must hâve appeared almost miraculous. Absence of prolonged mass un-
employment, almost constantly rising real incomes, an abundant system of 
social insurance, plentiful possibilities of social advancement, free access 
than even before to higher éducation — ail thèse made the acceptance of the 
existing social and political order almost a matter of course, even if some 
radical sects on the right and on the left could still point to many instances 
of social injustice. An imperfect world, but far more perfect than ever 
before. 
3. The investigation started with a small number of hypothèses that 
need some attention. 
A. In order to be successful in a démocratie system and a predomi-
nantly market-oriented economy, a policy designed to achieve a combina-
tion of relatively low rates of inflation and relatively low unemployment 
(relative meaning in this context, in relation to the average of the OECD 
countries), some form of continued coopération among unions, employers, 
and the relevant public authorities is required. One frequently used expres-
sion of such coopération is a "Social Contract" providing for formai or in-
formai and fairly fréquent meetings of the three groups mentioned above or 
of employers' and union représentatives. The participation of experts may 
add some spice to such gatherings and relieve the principals of much spade 
work, but is not an essential requirement, especially since most interest 
groups associate their own experts with the negotiations involved in thèse 
gatherings. 
744 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 37. NO 4 (1982) 
B. On the union side, the existence of a highly unified movement ap-
pears to be essential. This does not necessarily exclude such divisions as the 
existence of a small, not to say insignificant, compétitive movement as the 
Christian unions in West Germany. Nor does it appear incompatible with 
the kind of formai récognition of internai political divisions as for example 
the Austrian acceptance of political factions within the Trade Union Con-
fédération (Oe.G.B.) or the frictions existing among the différent trade 
union centers in Sweden since in the main thèse are not or at least not basi-
cally of a jurisdictional nature, or the sometimes sharp conflicts between the 
West German white collar confédération (DAG) and the DGB or any of its 
affiliated unions. What is excluded is the existence of fiercely compétitive 
union confédérations with différent idéologies but overlapping or identical 
jurisdictions. 
C. Almost equally important — perhaps even more important — is a 
high degree of centralization in the two main organized interest groups, em-
ployers and unions. A decentralized bargaining System may more closely 
correspond to the démocratie ideals of an observer, but it prevents almost 
certainly the conclusion of effective wage-price agreements. There must be 
authorities that can speak in behalf of employers and unions and commit 
them. The main difficulties in this respect occur more often on the union 
rather than the employers' side. This does not imply that there should be no 
decentralization whatsoever on either side. What was expected in our inves-
tigation was merely that a numerically small group of individuals could 
make (some fundamental) commitments with a high degree of effectiveness 
in behalf of large proportions of those responsible for management and em-
ployée interests. Variations in this respect among the countries examined in 
this study are not inconsiderable, but still permit to classify those union 
among the more highly centralized. The case of Switzerland which is not 
discussed hère, may suggest that union weakness may also help in main-
taining price stability. 
D. A further, if not essential though highly favorable, condition is the 
existence of a government friendly toward union interests. This, in almost 
ail European countries, means a Social démocratie or Socialist government 
since in most, though by no means ail, Western European countries the 
Socialist parties are closely associated with the main union confédérations. 
(The main exceptions are France and Italy, where so far the prédominant 
labor confédérations hâve been led by Communists or their associâtes.) This 
tends to ensure that in any serious conflict, the unions will enjoy the back-
ing or at least not the opposition of the authorities. 
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E. Some, though indirect and merely suggestive évidence for the de-
gree of authority of the contracting partners can be found in the strike fre-
quencies of the countries concerned. In other words, low strike frequencies 
appear to be, if not a condition, then a conséquence of a coopérative system 
that produces high employment and avoids high rates of inflation. 
F. Finally, but not last in the order of importance, an expanding econ-
omy would appear to be favorable to the success of this system. It is proba-
bly easier to maintain social harmony and a "Social Contract" when the 
issue is the distribution of incréments to personal income rather than that of 
losses or sacrifices. Short-term losses, however, may be acceptable and not 
endanger the survival of a system that has functioned satisfactorily for some 
time — the duration of which cannot easily be defined. For the longer run 
— say more than one or two years — significant losses can hardly be made 
acceptable except when the cause of the décline can clearly be related to fac-
tors external to the system and not subject to the control of any of the part-
ners to the contract including the government. Such may hâve been the case 
when the oil price sky-rocketed. 
The priority to be assigned to the two main objectives of the system is 
an important issue that may be solved in différent ways in différent coun-
tries and at différent times: low inflation and low unemployment. Accord-
ing to the Phillips curve thèse are contrasting objectives. In practice — as-
suming the validity of the Phillips curve — the choice présents itself most 
frequently only at the margin: how much more unemployment are we will-
ing to accept in order to obtain a lower rate of inflation or vice versa, what 
measure of increase in the rate of inflation do we regard as acceptable in ex-
change for lower unemployment. As we shall see, no consistent décision in 
this respect has been made in the three countries considered (with the possi-
ble exception of Austria where the choise was so far never very difficult and 
always in favor of lower unemployment). No ex-ante statement can be made 
about the choices made in the two other countries, except that the Swedish 
L.O. has consistently been pleading for top priority to be given to full em-
ployment. 
4. We shall now examine to what extent the institutions and policies of 
the three countries corresponded to the hypothèses set out above. 
AUSTRIA 
The most elaborate institutional arrangements are those of Austria. 
They go back in part to institutions of the old Austro-Hungarian monarchy 
746 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 37. NO 4 (1982) 
and were more fully developed during the period following the end of 
World War II. One contract are met7. 
Beyond the formai structure, that gives life to the contract, is a Per-
sonal understanding of the then leaders on both sides concluded in 1957. 
Between 1947 and 1951 while the physical reconstruction of the country 
was under way five price- and wage agreements were concluded between 
employers' associations and unions. They provided for a "relatively quiet 
climate to overcome the war-damage and secure the basis for the existence 
of the Austrian people"8. The unions were willing to accept the standard of 
living achieved in 1951-52 with minor adjustments through the balance of 
payments difficulties of 1953 and beyond untill the évacuation of Austria by 
foreign occupation forces in 1955 opened the doors for full self-govern-
ment. In March 1957, the union confédération (ÔGB), convinced that 
otherwise serious social conflicts were unavoidable, submitted proposais for 
measures to prevent inflationary development. They were in the main ac-
cepted by the government and the various Chambers (trade, agriculture). 
The "paritary" commmission for wages and prices was the resuit of this 
agreement. It was concluded between Julius Raab, then président of the 
Chamber of Trade (Industry), and the ÔGB président Johann Bôhm, and 
was supposed to be of a provisional nature, but has in fact lasted to this 
day. Its top level consists of a committee (Wage- and Price Commission) 
chaired by the Chancellor or his représentative, and consisting of delegates 
of employers and workers (the "social partners")9. Two sub-committees ex-
ist, one to deal with wages, the other with prices. None of thèse bodies has 
légal powers to enforce its décisions. Yet so great is the authority of the 
government and of the central bodies of the "social partners" that refusai 
to follow recommendations of the committees is exceedingly rare and full of 
dangers to the "déviant" group. The relatively large proportion of state-
owned or indirectly state-controlled enterprises guarantees the enforcement 
7 The most elaborate discussion of "The Authority of National Trade Union Confédér-
ations" is presented by John P. WINDMULLER in an article carrying the above title, with the 
addition of "A Comparative Analysis" in Ch. V of Union Power and Public Policy, éd. by 
David B. Lipsky, Ithaca, 1975. He lists three criteria: the proportion of union dues going to the 
Confédération, the latter's degree of control over its affiliâtes internai àffairs, and its rôle in 
collective bargaining. Austria and Israël rank as the most centralized movements. 
8 Fritz KLENNER, Zwanzig Jahr Paritatische Kommission, Arbeit und Wirtschaft, 
Vol. 31, April 1977. 
9 Unpublished manuscript by Franz PAPP on the Austrian trade unions. Also, Franz 
TRAXLER, "Organisationsform des OGB und 'Wirtschaftspartnerschaft' " , (undated manu-
script, 1979?); Gunther CHALOUPEK/Hannes SWOBODA, "Sozialpartnerschaft und Wirt-
schaftsentwicklung in der Fûnfziger and Sechziger Jahren", Ôsterreichische Zeitschrift fur 
Politikwissenschaft, Vol. 4, 75/3. The most important source in English is D. ROBINSON, 
Prices and Incomes Policies, The Austrian Expérience, Paris, OECD, 1972. 
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of what are euphemistically called the recommendations of the committees. 
The two largest banks in Austria are state-owned and, since under Austrian 
law they hold large percentages of the shares of many enterprises, the gov-
ernment can indirectly influence the décisions of most of thèse establish-
ments. Most of the privately owned firms are rather small10 and thus ill-
equipped to resist pressures from their own employers' organization, the 
trade unions and, last, but not least, the fédéral government. 
The most surprising aspects of the "social climate', of the country are 
twofold: (1) the willingness of the "social partners" to cooperate, and (2) 
the absence of any substantial rébellion on the part, especially, of the union 
members. 
The first of thèse is manifest in a large number of ways, from almost 
total social peace to continuous assertions of the readinéss on ail sides to 
seek compromises. This includes even the government which, in spite of a 
clear Socialist majority in parliament, makes valiant and usually successful 
efforts to obtain widespread consensus for most of the important measures 
it enacts. This mood of coopération on ail sides stands in sharp contrast to 
the rude and highly partisan methods of public criticism and the often intel-
lectually low level of the arguments used on ail sides. 
Even greater is the contrast between the actual degree of coopération 
and the violent political and social clashes that were characteristic of the 
first republic (1918-1934). It is sufficient to recall the bloody events of 1927 
and even more, those of February 1934, to measure the long way that Aus-
trian politics has travelled since. Its style has become, more civilized — per-
haps less intelligent and polished — but far less exciting and consequently 
less violent11. 
Most surprising is, at least at first sight, the absence of any significant 
working class rébellion against the officiai union and party leadership. The 
total collapse of the Austrian Communist Party is but one expression of this 
fact. It has no share in the occasional outbursts of student and youth rébel-
lion. And the object of the latter is found mainly in the area of foreign poli-
cy — armament exports to countries of dictatorial structures — or in oppo-
sition to the development of nuclear power. 
True, the high degree of centralization in wage and price bargaining 
makes effective opposition to décisions taken at the highest levels well-nigh 
io An establishment with 2,000 employées would be regarded as large in Austria. Inter-
view with Dr. KLOSE of the Fédéral Chamber of Trade. 
n The only political murder of the Second Republic occurred in 1981 and appears to 
hâve been caused by foreign agents and foreign issues. 
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impossible, but there are also few signs that opposition is even attempted. It 
may well be, as some observers point out that the Austrians — after their 
brief and rather unhappy excursion into all-too lively démocratie politics 
between 1918 and 1933-34 — are used to oligarchie régimes; but it cannot be 
denied that the objective possibilities for a change of the system exist and 
that indeed the leadership of the Republic has passed from the Conserva-
tives to the Socialists without any questioning of the basic values of the 
démocratie constitution, a fact widely at variance with the refusai of the up-
per classes after 1918 to accept the radical change that had occurred12. 
While a Socialist government has been in office for more than a décade 
and the unions could thus count on favorable actions on the législative and 
administrative fronts, this does not seem to hâve been an essential pre-
condition for the success of the scheme. The fact that it pre-dates the rise of 
the Socialists to prédominance on the political scène and that the preceding 
governments were careful in respecting union rights and status, suggests a 
political climate in which the labor movement could expect a friendly hear-
ing for its main demands. 
B.R.D. 
The German System of collective bargaining is less centralized than 
that of Austria. Still, " . . . it is common for consultation to take place be-
tween the central organizations (of employers and unions; A.S.) and their 
affiliâtes as well as among individual member associations."13 While agree-
ments are concluded by the individual unions or their sub-sections on a 
régional basis, on one hand, and the corresponding employers' associations 
on the other hand, a "provision is contained in the statutes of the DGB em-
powering it to issue guidelines on direct action that are binding on its affili-
âtes, and it has done so."14 In a variety of other ways — contributions to 
strike funds, publicity on the union side, risk-sharing, transfer of orders on 
12 Clear évidence of the radically différent relationship between employers and unions in 
the Second Republic can be seen in Alfred KLOSE's contribution, "Sozialpartnerschaft in 
Stagnationsphasen", in Bernd Marin, éd., Wachstumskrisen in Ôsterreich, Vol. IL pp. 220-42, 
Vienna, 1980. 
13 I.L.O., Collective Bargaining in Industrialized Market Economies. Hans REICHEL, 
The Fédéral Republic of Germany, Geneva, 1974, p. 255. 
14 Ibid. John WINDMULLER, op. cit., ranks the DGB among the less centralized or-
ganizations. It is true, of course, that in dealing with such powerful affiliâtes as the Metalwork-
ers Union the "DGB" will go easy and corne to terms with that giant union. Still, when this is 
achieved the DGB can go pretty far in giving direction to the bargaining policy of the other in-
dividual unions. This centralizing tendency is re-enforced by the authority of the employers' 
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the employer s* side — and by political pressures the central organizations 
maintain a high degree of discipline among their affiliâtes. 
The almost total absence of inter-union compétition contributes to this 
state of affairs. There is some friction between the DAG (a white-collar 
union) and the industrial unions over the organization of white collar work-
ers, and a minor ideological irritant in the shape of a small group of Chris-
tian unions. The massive inter-union division and compétition of the era 
prior to 1933 is, however, a thing of the past. In sum, unions speak on most 
fundamental issues with one voice and their commitment holds firm. 
This is especially true for the more or less formai gatherings of the cen-
tral organizations at top levels which, for a while and in somewhat elaborate 
ways, were held under the label of "Concerted Action". In principle, col-
lective bargaining is regarded as the autonomous activity of employers' as-
sociations and unions, and both sides insist upon the maintenance of their 
autonomy. This has never been interpreted to exclude the right of the gov-
ernment "to give the organizations and authorities concerned its views on 
the présent économie situation and probable developments, provided this is 
not felt to be a form of pressure."15 
However, legalism plays a décisive rôle in the industrial relations Sys-
tem of West Germany. Légal enactment of reforms which may originally 
hâve been obtained by bargaining and enshrined in agreements, is common-
ly regarded as advantageous. The law appears as a more stable and perma-
nent guarantee of social reforms than a mère contract. During a long period 
prior to 1933 compulsory médiation by governmental authority added to 
the influence that public institutions exerted in the industrial relations Sys-
tem. Most fringe benefits hâve long been provided by the state based on 
législation. This tradition can be traced back to the social insurance législa-
tion enacted under Bismarck in an attempt to weaken Socialist influence on 
the industrial workers of Impérial Germany. 
association, BDI. However, as WINDMULLER points out, the degree of central authority is 
not constant. Clearly, as he states, under Hans Bôckler's leadership the DGB played a décisive 
rôle in determining the policies of the German trade unions. "Concerted action." I believe, 
once again strengthened the authority of the DGB. Obviously, given the relative strength of the 
Metalworkers Union which comprises about one third of the DGB membership, the DGB poli-
cies will normally be in concert with the policies of their most powerful and combative affiliate. 
Indeed, the metalworkers most often set the pattern for the other unions. As to the German 
employers, Gérard Braunthal seems to rate the authority of the "Fédération of German Em-
ployers' Associations" rather high. Cf., his "The Fédération of German Industry in Politics", 
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1965, especially pp. 27/8. 
15 Ibid., p. 259. It is not easy to see how such governmental opinions can avoid being 
regarded by one side or the other as a form of pressure. 
750 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 37. NO 4 (1982) 
After the sharp break of the Nazi dictatorship the basic institutions of 
the system in the Weimar Republic were resuscitated, the main exception 
being the absence of compulsory médiation but arbitration is used16. Co-
determination, at first limited to coal and steel, represented a new depar-
ture, to be foliowed by others. 
Government influence on industrial relations is further enhanced by 
the institution of the "extension of agreements" which exists also in various 
forms in other countries. "Whenever a contract between an employer's as-
sociation and a union applies to employers with more than 50 percent of the 
employées in the industry and area, then it may be extended by government 
decree to ail employers and workers. Extension is not automatic however. It 
must be requested by one or both of the contracting parties and must be 
found to be in the 'public interest' by officiais of the Ministry of Labor. An 
opportunity is given for noncovered employers or workers to protest, but in 
most cases the request is granted."17 
Further measures ensuring some degree of institutionalizect coopéra-
tion among unions, employers and the government were taken later on. 
Thus in 1966 when there were signs of a recession, législation required the 
government to formulate guidelines for maintaining or re-establishing 
économie stability through coopération among authorities, trade unions, 
and the employers' associations. While not binding on any of the organiza-
tions the impact of thèse guidelines cannot be ignored. They were estab-
lished in informai meetings of the social partners. The circle of the partici-
pants at the meetings preparing such guidelines was gradually enlarged to 
include représentatives of government, fédéral banks, employers, unions, 
and the council of experts. The latter consists of university professors who 
since 1963, acting independently from the government but appointed by it, 
produce annual and, if regarded necessary, additional reports — without 
recommendations — on the économie situation and prospects. 
Since 1971, however, recommendations hâve emerged from the gather-
ings of the larger informai group — called "concerted action" that had un-
doubtedly considérable impact on actual events. The "communiques" 
resulting from the meetings of the "Concerted Action", frequently the ob-
ject of extensive bargaining, were important documents. In some sensé 
16 "Reliance on arbitration to détermine wage increases springs partly from reluctance 
to strike, but reflects also the gênerai German tendency to rely on the government to solve 
problems." Clark KERR, "Collective Bargaining in Post-War Germany." In Contemporary 
Collective Bargaining in Seven Countries, A. STURMTHAL, éd., Cornell University, 1957, p. 
193. 
n KERR, ibid., p. 198. 
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thèse pronouncements hâve re-enforced the control which the central organ-
izations of the "social partners" exert over the actions of their affiliâtes. 
Later events — especially conflicts over the issue of extended co-
determination, attempts to use the re-organization of corporate structures 
to "escape" from co-determination, and the use of the "lock-out" by em-
ployer — hâve set an end to the officiai meetings of the "Concerted Ac-
tion". Yet, informai gatherings continue and the employers' organizations 
appear eager to re-establish the earlier officiai machinery. 
A high degree of centralized authority thus exists in fact in collective 
bargaining and the absence of effective inter-union compétition adds to the 
control which the central organizations exert over their affiliâtes. A warning 
not to abuse this authority may be seen in a number of wild-cat strikes in 
1969, but no lasting effect on the System emerged from the events, distur-
bing as they were at the time. In gênerai, however, strikes are infrequent 
and short. Many of them do not involve économie issues, but disputes over 
the forms and degree of union participation in management. 
Political events hâve favored the development of this institutionalized 
System of an incomes policy. For many years, the Socialdemocratic Party 
has been represented in the fédéral government, at first as a strong but 
junior partner of the Christian Démocratie Union (C.D.U.) whose majority 
is employer-oriented, later and until the présent (1981) as the leading factor 
in a coalition with the Free Démocratie Party (F.D.P.) under the Chancel-
lors Willy Brandt and later Helmut Schmidt. The unions could thus count 
upon a favorable réception for many of their ideas at the seat of political 
power, even though only one of the top trade union leaders is a member of 
the fédéral législature. Many, if not most of the Socialdemocratic members 
of parliament are of course unionists. 
High économie growth rates added a great deal to the favorable climate 
for social coopération. Thus during the period 1950 to 1962 West Germany 
with an average annual growth rate of 7.2 percent of real gross national pro-
duct was the leader in économie advance in Western Europe and North 
America. In OECD only Japan had a higher growth rate: while the later 
60's were not quite so favorable, they still produced average annual incré-
ments of around 5 percent of GNP and it was only in the 70's that the 
growth rate showed clear signs of weakening. During most of the post 
World War II period, the économie situation permitted the distribution of 
substantial annual incréments. 
However, the year 1980 set off a less favorable growth period. The real 
growth rate predicted by the German fédéral government as a low 2 lh per-
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cent turned out to be 2 or 1.8 percent (the first figure relates to the domestic 
product)18. Moreover, inflation attained a rate of 6 percent, exceeding the 
projected increase of 5 percent. 
With further worsening of the situation in 1981, it would appear that 
the West German relative success can only be so described by increasing the 
emphasis on the word "relative". Compared with Britain, France, Italy, 
West Germany still appears more successful, but for the West German citi-
zens being successful by comparison with highly "unsuccessful" économies 
is scant comfort. Unemployment in August 1981 was at 5.8 percent, far 
below the U.K. (11.1%), the U.S. (7.2%), and France (7.7%) according to 
the "Economist" of October 3-8, 1981, and inflation with 6.5% below that 
of most other OECD members. 
SWEDEN 
Main characteristics of the Swedish collective bargaining System are the 
strong employers' and workers' organizations — around 95 percent of the 
workers and 70 percent of the white collar people are organized in manufac-
turing — and well established patterns of bargaining19. In the 60's the then 
existing System was extended to bargaining in the public sector. While there 
are several trade union centers — L.O. for manual workers, T.C.O. for 
salaried employées, and S.A.C.O. for professional employées — only occa-
sional friction exists among the three. Within the three organizations the 
degree of solidarism is very high, permitting the leaders to speak rather 
authoritatively for their affiliâtes. 
The centralization of the LO is not complète. The power to rnake bind-
ing collective agreements rests with the member unions and the LO has no 
formai power to make the central agreement binding on its member unions 
or otherwise force them to accept it, i.e., to assume the obligation to imple-
ment the central agreement by making collective agreements in accordance 
with the rules laid down there. On a few occasions, member unions hâve 
refused to participate in centralized collective bargaining. Thus in 1966 the 
Transport Workers' Union preferred to negotiate on its own, and in 1971 
and 1973 this union stayed in but refused to accept the central agreement 
unless certain conditions were met. In 1966 the Transport Workers' Union 
was forced by the SAF (Employées Association; A.S.), under the threat of a 
18 Annual économie report 1981 of the fédéral government, p. 25. 
19 Hagberg GUNNAL, "Récent Trends in Collective Bargaining in Sweden", Collective 
Bargaining in Industrialized Market Economies, Geneva, I.L.O., 1974. 
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gênerai nation-wide lockout, to accept the central agreement, but in 1971 
and in 1973 it was successful in obtaining extra benefits for some of its 
member groups. 
"In some respects the SAF is more tightly knit than the L.O."20 On the 
employers' side, one fédération exerts prédominant influence, S.A.F. com-
prises 41 individual branch associations. Separate organizations represent 
the state as employer. However, a trend toward centralization has reduced 
the number of organizations on both sides. 
While earlier, right after World War II, the individual organizations 
affiliated with L.O. and S.A.F. bargained on their own "without any ap-
préciable interférence from the central employers' and workers' organiza-
tions"21 évolution since 1956 has led to central agreements between the 
respective confédérations "which set limits to the cost increases resulting 
from new contracts"22. Although thèse were only recommendations, they 
hâve had in practice a binding effect. This has helped avoid the earlier ten-
dency for each individual agreement to be regarded as minimum for any 
subséquent accord. In the past, this gave a strong push to inflation. L.O. 
argued successfully for "wage solidarity" rather than compétition. Its ef-
fort was supported by the fact that Socialdemocratic governments with 
which the unions were closely associated were in office for several décades 
without interruption. Détails were, of course, left to further negotiations at 
the industry and company level. In gênerai there has thus been a trend 
toward centralization in bargaining, supplemented of course by agreements 
on spécial conditions and détails at the industry and company level. While 
20 Anders V I C T O R I N , " T h e Implementat ion of a Wage Policy: Centralized Collective 
Bargaining in Sweden" , V. 19, Scandinavian Studies in Law, 1975, p . 299. The mère fact that 
the author can refer to this single exception indicates how great the centralized discipline is. 
However , the use of pièce rates and j o b évaluation in combinat ion with the "so l idar i s t ic" wage 
policy has created certain difficulties to which Victorin refers. (pp. 308/9) . 
21 Ibid., p. 342. "Sweden's Industrial Relations System is Marked by a High Degree of 
Centralization and, Despite an Uncharacteristic and Disruptive Pay Dispute in 1980, A Conti-
nuing Tradition Between Unions and Employers of Solving Problems Through Collective Bar-
gaining", European Industrial Relations Review, No. 91, August 1981, p. 10. A very informa-
tive history of how centralization came about is detailed in Peter JACKSON and Keith 
SISSON, "Employers' Confédérations in Sweden and the U.K. and the Significance of Indus-
trial Infrastructure", British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. XIV, No. 3. 
22 HOGBERG, ibid. It is not widely known that "LO requires the executive board of 
each national union to retain the power of final décision in questions concerning the termina-
tion of collective contracts, the acceptance or rejection of proposais for agreement, or for 
resorting to direct action. This rule éliminâtes binding contract ratification votes and enhances 
the authority of union officers." 
WINDMULLER, op. cit. V. 97. According to Elvander quoted by Windmuller this rule goes 
back in fact to the beginning of this century. 
754 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 37. NO 4 (1982) 
welcomed in principle, centralization has also created some problems: pro-
longed and complex negotiations, friction between manual and the white 
collar unions and re-enforcement of the well-known phenomenon of wages-
drift. Moreover, the agreements tend increasingly to deal also with the dis-
tribution of the available margin of funds among direct and indirect labor 
costs, various groups of the working population, pensions, etc. Spécial em-
phasis is being placed on improving low wages so as to reduce incomé dif-
ferentials, a tendency which is not infrequently counter-acted by wage-drift, 
i.e., suppléments to contract rates paid according to the situation on the 
labor market for a particular skill or in a particular area, in contradiction to 
the union leaders' tendency to reduce wage differentials. 
The 1976 Codetermination at Work Act provided that collective con-
tracts are legally binding and are automatically extended to cover new mem-
bers of the signatory organizations. The employer must negotiate with any 
union "to which he is bound by a collective agreement" before he décides 
"on any important change in his opérations" — e.g., closures, transfers, 
etc. Such negotiations must also take place on any other issue which in the 
view of the union will affect the interests of its members. 
The Act further authorizes "unions with established bargaining rights 
to negotiate 'joint régulation' provisions on questions relating to the con-
clusion or termination of contracts of employment, the supervision of work 
and the opération of the company in gênerai."23 So far no such agreements 
hâve been concluded with the employers' organization SAF which is the 
central body for 36 national employers' fédérations. 
The typical negotiation proceeds in three stages: 
1. Central arrangements with a validity of one to three years. Thèse set the 
framework for recommendations to the affiliated bodies. "Such 're-
commendations' are invariably adopted."24 
2. Negotiations of the national organizations at the industry level about the 
distribution of industry-wide "wage kitties"25 and conclusion of con-
tracts. 
3. Bargaining at the local level involving the union and the shop stewards 
on the implementation of the national agreement of the second stage. 
Although labor conflicts are not exceptional26, industrial relations are 
relatively smooth, partly as a resuit of favorable économie growth. 
23 European Industrial Relations Review (EIRR), op. cit. 
24 E IRR, op. cit., p . 11. 
25 Ibid. 
26 E.g . , 1975 was a heavy strike year as was 1979, though the strike dura t ion was shorter . 
In 1980, " a n uncharacterist ic and disruptive pay d i spu t e " occurred. E IRR, op. cit., p . 10. 
UNEMPLOYMENT, INFLATION AND «GUEST WORKERS»: COMPARATIVE STUDY 755 
TABLE 4 
Growth of Gross Domestic Product 
(% changes from year to year) 
1955 3.0% 1965 4.1% 1975 2.5% 
1956 3.3 1966 2.2 1976 1.6 
1957 2.4 1967 3.6 1977 -2.4 
1958 2.4 1968 3.7 1978 1.4 
1959 5.2 1969 4.8 1979 4.0 
1960 3.8 1970 5.5 1980 2.2 
1961 5.7 1971 1.0 
1962 4.3 1972 2.1 
1963 5.2 1973 3.8 
1964 6.9 1974 4.1 
Source:27 
It seems probable that the favorable growth rates — until about 1975 
— hâve contributed to the moderate (average) price increases while the 
unemployment rates were kept at exceeding low levels. 
THE "GUEST-WORKERS" 
To what extent is the relatively favorable record of the three countries 
in keeping unemployment rates below those of most OECD countries the 
resuit of their "guest-worker" policy? Hâve they solved their native unem-
ployment simply by throwing its burden on the countries from which the 
guest-workers came? The view that this is indeed the case, is rather wide-
spread. A gpod example is Lester Thurow who refers directly to Switzerland 
but makes it pretty clear that his conclusion also applies to West Germany. 
Austria is not specifically mentioned by him. He writes: 
When tight monetary policies lead to falling employment, the unemployed can be ex-
ported to the countries from which they came. And this is exactly what was done in 
West Germany and Switzerland. In 1978 industrial employment was 12 percent 
below 1973 levels in West Germany and 10 percent lower in Switzerland. This did not 
lead to massive unemployment since each country sent foreign workers home. Scaled 
up to an economy the size of ours, the Swiss rounded up 10 million workers and sent 
them home. Which 10 million American workers do we round up and send home?... 
At some point, even West Germany runs out of foreign workers to send home...28 
27 Source: OECD, National Account Statistics. In 1975 priées. 
28 Lester C . T H U R O W , The Zero-Sum Society. Distribution and the Possibilities for 
Economie Change, Basic Books, N . Y . , 1980, p p . 62-3. I am not sure where Thurow obtained 
the 12 percent figure for the réduction of industrial employment between 1973 and 1978. My 
own calculation based on O E C D and ILO figures would show a lower rate of décline. 
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To begin with, it should be understood that with the exception of 
France none of the Western European countries regarded itself as a country 
of immigration. West Germany absorbed large numbers — estimated at 9 to 
10 million — of ethnie Germans at the end of the hostilities in 1945 but this 
was a political necessity, not dictated by économie considérations. France, 
whose birth rate has long been declining and whose manpower resources 
had been depleted by the frightful losses of its youth during two world wars, 
has long been worried about its "démographie insufficiency"29. It was 
réceptive for what was called "sélective immigration", i.e., the permanent 
absorption of "assimilable" immigrants. 
In addition, it should be kept in mind that not ail guest-workers wish to 
stay permanently in the countries to which they had migrated. A large, 
though unknown, proportion merely intends to stay for as long as needed to 
accumulate a certain amount of capital with which to establish a small busi-
ness or acquire some farmland upon their return home. Frequently, the gov-
vernments of their country of origin maintain contacts with their nationals 
abroad and encourage them to return home, in the hope that their recently 
acquired skills will contribute to the welfare of their home country. 
Thus in most Western European countries a large proportion of for-
eign migrants who came to work in the developed industrial countries such 
as West Germany, Austria and Sweden were brought in, in response to 
économie needs30. The réduction of the number of guest-workers, however, 
was not always dictated by the same kind of considérations. Thus, in the 
case of Switzerland which Lester Thurow seems — erroneously — to regard 
as typical, the main motivation to reduce the number of foreign workers in 
the early sixties, long before the manpower requirements shrank, was the 
"fear of loss of national identity"31. In a small, four-language country, sur-
rounded by great powers using three of the same languages, this fear — 
whatever one's moral judgment — does not appear totally unjustified. In 
any case the Swiss expérience does not justify Professor Thurow's infer-
ences. 
In what follows it should be kept in mind that according to articles 48 
and 49 of the Treaty of Rome — the act constituting the European Econom-
ie Community (EEC) — nationals of the member states hâve the same rights 
in employment in ail of the member states. In West Germany (and France) 
some groups demanded that thèse articles, either fully or partly, be made 
29 Philip L. M A R T I N and Mark J. M I L L E R , "Gues t -workers : Lessons from Western 
E u r o p e " , Industrial and Labor Relations Review, April 1980, Vol. 33, N o . 3, p . 317. 
30 " W i t h the limited exception of the French case, guest-worker policies weire a response 
to the exigencies of the e c o n o m y " , M A R T I N and M I L L E R , op. cit., p . 317. 
3i Ibid. 
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applicable to ail foreign workers. This failed. Deliberate measures to reduce 
the number of guest-workers were thus limited to the nationals of non-EEC 
member states, as far as West Germany and Sweden are concerned. Since 
Austria is not a signatory of the Treaty of Rome, it is not subject to this 
restriction. 
Beginning in 1970, West Germany — then employing 1.8 million for-
eign workers, a number that was to grow until 1973 — applied new princi-
pes in dealing with immigrant workers. "Foreign workers were no longer 
regarded as temporary help, usable especially in jobs that German workers 
were unwilling to accept. Under union pressure the government halted addi-
tional recruitment of foreign workers while improving the lot of those al-
ready in Germany."32 Under existing régulations many foreign workers had 
acquired the right of permanent residency and work permits. In due course, 
the children of thèse guest-workers as well can be expected to enter the labor 
market of their host country, even though they are unlikely to hâve acquired 
its citizenship, especially in West Germany. 
In gênerai, guest-workers from non-EEC countries start off in West 
Germany with a one-year work and résidence permit, followed by a two-
year permit. For the first year they are limited to a given employer. After 
this initial period they are free to change employment. In accordance with 
OECD recommendations, they receive five-year permits after five years of 
permit renewals, and then are eligible for permanent work and residency 
authorization33. 
At issue is the extent to which the domestic unemployment problem of 
the immigrant countries was solved or mitigated at the expense of foreign 
non-EEC workers. For West Germany the officiai OECD statistics indicate 
that the employment of foreigners amounted in 1965 to 1.119 thousand out 
of a total dépendent employment of 21.758 thousand34; then it reached its 
peak in 1973 when out of a total dépendent employment of 22.564 thousand 
no fewer than 2.425 thousand were foreigners35. At that time foreigners 
represented thus more than 10.7 percent of dépendent employment and not 
quite 9 percent of the total labor force including self-employed and helping 
family members. By 1977 the number of foreign workers had declined to 
1.872 thousand out of a total dépendent employment of 21.347 thousand 
32 Ibid., p . 318. Indeed, late in the 70 's , some restrictions on the immigrat ion of wives 
and children of guest-workers were ameliorated. This caused considérable increases in social 
services and difficult problems in the area of schools, kindergartens, etc. In 1976, the children 
of foreigners represented 16 percent of ail live birth in West Germany . 
33 Ibid., p. 323, note 26. 
34 Foreign workers play an insignificant rôle among the self-employed. 
35 OECD, Economie Surveys, June 1979. 
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and a total labor force of 26.074 thousand (8.8 and close to 7.2 percent, 
respectively). There was thus a réduction of the share of foreign workers, in 
both methods of calculation, but it did not quite represent the wholesale dis-
charge and repatriation of foreign workers that Professor Thurow and so 
many other foreign observers thought had happened. It is probably not too 
far fetched to assume that the réduction resulted primarily if not exclusively 
from the blockage of the immigration of foreign workers in 1973. It is inter-
esting to observe that between 1974 and 1977 the total number of foreigners 
living in West Germany dropped by less than 200,000 while that of foreign 
employed diminished by almost 500,000; the différence is mainly explained 
by the arrivai of family members of foreign workers under the now relaxed 
restrictions. 
However, to do Professor Thurow's argument full justice, the net 
figures used above do not reveal the whole trend. A careful analysis shows a 
very complex picture36. 
According to Bôhning, 2.6 million foreign workers were in the Fédéral 
Republic in September 1973. This includes both employed and unemployed. 
Four years later, the author indicates, that figure had declined to 1,950,000. 
Thus the stock of foreign workers had been reduced by 665,000, the number 
of employed foreign workers by 725,000. 
However, some 20,000 foreign workers had been naturalized during 
the period in question, 25,000 had died, 175,000 were unregistered and un-
employed, etc. This results in an "internai réduction" of 221,000. On the 
other hand, 470,000 foreign workers were added of whom 370,000 were new 
immigrants and 100,000 youngsters who had joined their parents earlier. 
Thus more than 900,000 foreign workers must hâve left West Germany, 
considerably more than the réduction in bottom-line numbers would indi-
cate. This, however, includes an unknown number of migrants who would 
hâve returned home even if conditions in West Germany had not deterio-
rated. We can, therefore, only guess at the number of those "migrants with 
36 W.R. BÔHNING, "International Migration in Western Europe: Reflections on the 
Past Five Years", International Labour Review, Vol. 118, No. 4, July-August 1979. F. 
BOURGIGNON and G. GALLAIS — HAMMONO with Bernard FERNET, International 
Labour Migrations and Economie Choices: The European Case, Development Center of 
O.E.C.D., Paris, 1977. 
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a weak légal status (who) were simply shown the door."37 Still, by no stretch 
of the imagination do thèse figures justify the number of ten million work-
ers at which Professor Thurow — by scaling up to the population of the 
U.S. — arrives. 
For Austria, where unemployment rates are consistently among the 
lowest in the West, varying between 1.6 and 2.1 percent during the 4 years 
from 1977 to 1980, total foreign employment38 dropped from 189,000 in 
1977 to 175,000 in 1980, thus by some 14,000 i.e., lh percentage points of 
the total labor force. Almost 3,700 were registered unemployed of whom 
close to 2,500 received unemployment benefits39. 
Unemployment in Sweden dropped from 98,000 in 1973 to 94,000 in 
1978. No significant change in the employment of foreign workers occurred 
during that period. 
Ail in ail, in the three countries considered, only West Germany re-
duced foreign employment to a significant degree but hardly by a number 
that would explain, to a substantial extent, the relative maintenance — until 
quite recently — of high employment figures in the Fédéral Republic. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Given the small sample, no more than suggestive inferences can be 
drawn from the resuit. There is, moreover, a warning signal against préma-
turé affirmations in the example of the Dutch wages policy in the first post-
war years40. Then, as is the case now, it appeared to some observer s that a 
37 BÔHNING, op. cit., p. 403. It should be noted that the bulk of foreign labor is em-
ployed in the secondary sector, thus most affected by a recession. See, Martin SLATER, 
"Migrant Employment, Recessions, and Return Migration: Some Conséquences for Migration 
Policy and Development", Studiesin Comparative International Development, Vol. XIV, No. 
3, 4. Most of the réduction in foreign employment occurred between 1973 and 1978 when, ac-
cording to the O.E.C.D. Economie Survey for Germany, June 1979 (p. 13, note 11): "The 
Cumulative Net Withdrawal of Foreigners from the Labor Force Was 671 Thousand Persons, 
Equivalent to 3 Percent of the Dépendent Labour Force in 1978. In 1978 the Net Outflow of 
Foreign Workers Was Down to 45,000 Persons." A high level of hatred for the guest-workers 
was noted in "Der Spiegel" of September 15, 1980. 
38 This, as was pointed out above, includes nationals of EEC countries as Austria is not 
a member of EEC. 
39 Source: Ôsterreichischer Arbeiterkammertag: Wirtschafts-und-Sozial-Statistisches 
Taschenbuch 1981, various tables. Also: OECD, Economie Survey: Austria, Jan. 1980. 
40 Cf. Jan PEN, "Trade Union Attitudes Toward Central Wage Policy: Remarks on the 
Dutch Expérience", In Sturmthal and Scoville, The International Labor Movement in Transi-
tion, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1973. Also, John P. WINDMULLER, "Labor Rela-
tions in the Netherlands", Ithaca, N.Y., 1969. 
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permanent or at least long-term solution to the problem of price stability 
under conditions of full employment had been found — only to discover 
that there was a time limit beyond which the experiment could not be ex-
tended. 
Still, in the face of what seems in many countries an untractable prob-
lem even a temporary success deserves examination with the secret hope that 
perhaps some aspects of the "solution" might be transférable or adaptable 
to the conditions of a différent country and a différent period. Unfortu-
nately, it will be our sad conclusion that, at least as far as the U.S. and per-
haps Canada are concerned, a transfer or adaptation seems impossible, for 
at least the foreseeable future. 
One of the most important conditions for the results obtained in the 
three countries examined is the existence of a unified trade union movement 
with a high degree of central authority in the area of collective bargaining. 
Whether the government is actually présent at the negotiations as was the 
case in West Germany and is — directly or indirectly — still the case in 
Austria, or absent as in Sweden, seems less important than at first expected. 
The mère fact that global negotiations about the distribution of the national 
income or of its incrément involves reasoning in macro-economic terms 
forces a high degree of realism upon the participants at the negotiations, 
regardless of whether there are représentatives of the so-called national in-
terest présent or not. 
Thinking in terms of collective class interests, though less influential 
than a century ago, is probably still more accepted on the Continent than in 
the U.K. or in the U.S.A. The solidaristic wage policy in Sweden may be a 
symptom of this way of thinking as is the fact noted by Yves Delamotte, 
that the British productivity agreement model has not spread to the Conti-
nent because there is no équivalent to the work rules of Great Britain which 
tend to protect the group at the expense of gênerai économie progress41. 
Undoubtedly, the existence of a government friendly to labor makes it 
easier for the labor leaders to appeal to their members not to create condi-
tions that may endanger the survival of such a government. Moreover, al-
ternatives to immédiate increases in labor costs can be found in measures of 
social policy that are under the control of the political authorities. A trade-
off between immédiate and deferred advantages then may occur. While 
41 Yves DELAMOTTE, "British Productivity Agreements, German Rationalization 
Agreements and French Employment Security Agreements", International Institute for 
Labour Studies, Bulletin No. 9, 1972, especially, pp. 34/5. 
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favorable political conditions hâve existed at times in the U.S.42 and may oc-
cur again, a System of centralized bargaining seems most unlikely to émerge 
in the foreseeable future. Never in its history hâve American unions granted 
to a central ail-union body authority to détermine or even openly influence 
their bargaining policies, stratégies, and ultimate outcome. That there may 
be informai exchanges of views, advice, promises of support is extremely 
likely; but formai constitutional authority rests with the individual union 
and sometimes even with its component parts. 
Economie growth appears to be favorable to the maintenance of a 
social contract. While there are disputes and often sharp disagreements 
about the distribution of whatever incrément in GNP the economy pro-
duces, it is clearly easier to settle those conflicts than disagreements about 
the distribution of losses. There are probably not insignificant différences in 
national union behavior in this respect. European unions may also, in their 
majority and for obvious reasons, understand more readily the impact of 
international developments on their economy, its greater dependence on in-
ternational trade and, therefore, the need for international competitiveness. 
But I hesitate to go too far in this generalization: the différences in this mat-
ter within national labor movements may outweigh the international dis-
tinctions. 
A supply of temporary foreign workers that can fairly easily be dis-
charged may be of some help in keeping down both inflationary wage pres-
sures and unemployment rates, but the importance of this factor varies a 
good deal from country to country. For the three countries studied in this 
project, this factor while not negligible, had surely no décisive impact on the 
outcome. 
There is, perhaps principally, a fundamental choice of priorities to be 
made. Sweden and Austria hâve most clearly opted for full employment as 
the suprême objective of économie policy while West Germany, especially 
in the course of 1980-81, appears to hâve become more hésitant in deciding 
the issue and has accepted a fairly large rate of unemployment. Obviously, 
in practice, the problem présents itself as an issue at the margin (which, in 
this case, may be too substantial to be called "marginal"); as a trade-off 
between a certain amount of unemployment versus a change in the rate of 
inflation or vice versa. 
It would be improper and tend to distort the picture were I not to refer 
to the "costs" of some of the factors outlined above that are favorable to 
42 See Clark KERR, Governmental Wage Restraints: Their Limits and Uses in a Mobi-
lized Economy. Papers and Proceedings, American Economie Reviews, Vol. XLII, No. 2, May 
1952. 
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the adoption and maintenance of a "social contract". Somewhat over-
stated, they amount to the establishment of an oligarchie System of indus-
trial relations. On both sides of the bargaining table there are spokesmen 
with authority to make commitments in behalf of their constituents. Repre-
senting unified movements, they are not exposed to the danger of being 
overwhelmed by compétitive organizations — except in the extrême and 
temporary case of a major rébellion against the System as in 1968-69. In the 
normal course of events, thèse spokesmen are insulated from pressures 
from below by a whole séries of layers of hierarchy. At the same time their 
décisions hâve such an obvious impact on the national economy that sec-
tional interests are of lesser concern for them than if they were to speak only 
in behalf of relatively smaller groups. While the latter can indeed improve 
their lot by group action at the expense of other — not necessarily working-
class — groups without major macro-economic conséquences, a redistribu-
tion of national income in favor of an entire class, especially as sizeable a 
class as that represented by the trade union movement as a whole, cannot 
but hâve an impact on the entire economy. Thus both insight into wider per-
spectives and a high degree of insulation from rank and file pressure com-
bine to permit the leaders a wider range of freedom of choice but also a bet-
ter insight into its conséquences than hâve those closer to the base. Technoc-
racy and democracy and the défense of group interests in économie policy-
making hâve not gone too well together so far. 
Le chômage, l'inflation et les travailleurs étrangers 
Étude comparative de trois pays européens 
Trois pays occidentaux ont trouvé une solution partielle et possiblement tempo-
raire au problème de parvenir à un degré élevé d'emploi tout en gardant leur taux 
d'inflation à un niveau relativement bas. Si l'on traduit cette conjoncture dans les 
termes du vocabulaire de l'économie politique, cela signifie qu'ils ont évité le piège 
de la courbe de Phillips laquelle veut qu'un taux de chômage bas exige une inflation 
marquée ou que vice versa, une inflation faible ne peut se maintenir qu'au prix d'un 
chômage élevé. Ces pays sont la Suède, l'Allemagne de l'Ouest et l'Autriche. 
Comme l'article le démontre, l'indice du coût de la vie en Suède, en Allemagne 
de l'Ouest et en Autriche s'est élevé en moyenne pendant la période de 1961 à 1980 
d'environ 4.7 à 5.0 pour cent comparé à 6.0 pour cent dans l'ensemble des pays de 
l'O.C.D.E., à 5.5 pour cent aux États-Unis. Ces résultats doivent être examinés en 
relation avec le taux moyen de chômage. Ces derniers sont 2.5 pour cent en Allema-
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gne de l'Ouest, de 2.0 pour cent en Suède et en Autriche alors qu'ils ont atteint une 
moyenne de plus de 6.0 pour cent aux États-Unis pendant la période de 1968 à 1980. 
C'est ainsi que l'Autriche s'est fort bien classée dans les deux domaines. L'Allema-
gne de l'Ouest et la Suède ont particulièrement bien réussi en autant qu'il s'est agi du 
chômage. Pourquoi ces pays ont-ils fait mieux que les autres pays d'économie de 
marché en Occident? 
Une étude du taux de croissance du produit national brut constitue un élément 
de réponse. En général, le taux de l'expansion économique y était aussi élevé que 
celui des pays européens de PO.C.D.E., à l'exception de la récession de 1975. Cepen-
dant, il est possible que la cause de l'existence simultanée d'une croissance forte, 
d'une inflation peu élevée et d'un chômage faible soit ailleurs. 
Le deuxième élément de réponse peut se rattacher à l'existence dans ces trois 
pays de ce qu'on est convenu d'appeler «un contrat social». Celui-ci prévoit la tenue 
de nombreuses réunions conjointes des syndicats, des associations d'employeurs et, 
quelquefois, des représentants des gouvernements aux fins d'établir pour l'année sui-
vante des augmentations maximales des salaires et des prix propres à assurer une sta-
bilité raisonnable des prix. 
À quelles conditions un «contrat social» est-il efficace et combien de temps est-il 
susceptible de durer? La principale condition réside dans un mouvement syndical 
unifié ou qui, à tout le moins, n'est pas aux prises avec la concurrence qui se présente 
dans un mouvement en voie d'éclatement. On retrouve cette situation avantageuse 
dans les trois pays, même s'il ne faut pas exclure toute friction occasionnelle. 
De plus, les parties aux négociations tant d'un côté que de l'autre doivent possé-
der des dirigeants énergiques qui ont l'autorité de prendre des engagements au nom 
de leurs affiliés et de les mettre en vigueur. Plus ces dirigeants sont protégés contre 
les pressions de la base, plus il leur est facile de s'engager dans les politiques qui ne 
sont pas populaires auprès des travailleurs ou des employeurs. L'existence d'un gou-
vernement sympathique au syndicalisme est un facteur sinon indispensable du moins 
favorable dans les circonstances. Un taux relativement élevé de croissance économi-
que est également favorable, bien qu'il ne soit pas essentiel. Dans ces conditions, les 
grèves ne sont pas généralement fréquentes. 
Bien que, sauf en Autriche, aucun «contrat social» n'ait dépassé deux décen-
nies, il est difficile, dans l'état actuel de nos connaissances, de prédire la durée limite 
d'un contrat de ce genre ou de déterminer les conditions qui favorisent sa durée. 
Comme une étude plus approfondie des systèmes de relations professionnelles le 
démontre, des facteurs accidentels, étrangers aux systèmes eux-mêmes peuvent y être 
responsables de l'écroulement de l'expérience. 
La deuxième partie de l'article traite d'une manière plus détaillée de l'évolution 
qui s'est produite en Allemagne de l'Ouest, en Autriche et en Suède. C'est dans un 
certain sens une façon de tester la validité des hypothèses présentées dans la première 
partie de l'étude. Dans l'ensemble, les hypothèses ressortent fort bien de cette vérifi-
cation, même si l'on ne peut répondre d'une manière concluante à la question de sa-
voir s'il s'agit de la cause ou de l'effet. (La croissance économique résulte-t-elle de la 
paix sociale que le contrat peut créer ou en est-elle une conséquence?) 
La dernière partie de l'article traite de la question de savoir si la situation relati-
vement favorable de ces pays résulte de leurs politiques à l'endroit des «travailleurs 
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invités» (guest-workers) comme certains auteurs l'ont prétendu. Le grand nombre de 
travailleurs étrangers attirés dans ces pays, notamment en Allemagne de l'Ouest, a 
sans doute beaucoup contribué à leur prospérité. Ont-ils aussi servi à réduire l'im-
pact du chômage? On admet que, à l'exception de la France, aucun des pays de 
l'Europe occidentale se considère comme pays d'immigration. L'immigration mas-
sive en Allemagne occidentale à la fin de la deuxième guerre mondiale était dictée par 
la nécessité politique et non pas des considérations économiques. L'entrée massive de 
travailleurs étrangers pour des raisons économiques se produisit durant les années 
d'abondance des décennies 1950 à 1960. 
Il faut garder en mémoire que ce ne sont pas tous les travailleurs immigrants qui 
désirent demeurer en permanence dans le pays d'immigration. D'autre part, les ci-
toyens des États membres de la Communauté économique européenne (CEE) sont 
maintenant libres d'aller d'un pays à l'autre pour y occuper un emploi. Ainsi, toutes 
les mesures restrictives de l'Allemagne de l'Ouest doivent s'exercer contre les natio-
naux des pays non-membres. (Pour ces motifs et également pour d'autres raisons, la 
Suisse ne peut servir de modèle, puisqu'elle ne fait pas partie de la C.E.E.) Les statis-
tiques indiquent que, depuis 1973, le nombre des travailleurs étrangers a diminué en 
Allemagne de l'Ouest, apparemment plutôt par la cessation du recrutement que par 
un rapatriement en masse. En Autriche, on ne trouve qu'une réduction insignifiante 
du nombre de travailleurs étrangers. Il en est de même en Suède. Ainsi,même s'il y a 
eu un accroissement marqué de sentiments xénophobes en particulier de la part de la 
population allemande contre le grand nombre de Turcs qui travaillent ou viennent se 
fixer en Allemagne fédérale, aucune mesure rigoureuse n'a été prise pour améliorer 
le sort des sans-travail aux dépens des travailleurs étrangers. 
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